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ABSTRACT: Reviews and discusses Sandra Harding's tripartite model of feminist 
critiques of science. Relationship between scientific inquiry, objectivity, and values; 
Application of Donna Haraway's and Helen Longino's insights; Feminist scientists as 
postmodern; Standpoints of postmodern feminists; Redirection of feminist critiques of 
science. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Feminist scholarship is largely made up of critique, a portion of which focuses 
on the taken-for-granted knowledge of scientists.1 Focusing on the biases in 
scientific knowledge claims, the institutionalized segregation of the scientific 
community, and the dangerous things that scientists have produced in the 
twentieth century, feminist critiques have exposed, alongside other critiques 
in the philosophy and sociology of science, that one's perspective influences 
what one questions about the world, how one goes about answering those 
questions, how one applies those answers, and how one gives an account of 
how one knows what one knows. 
 
In this paper, I discuss the various epistemological positions that have both 
informed and sprung from feminist critiques of science and clarify the assumptions 
regarding science and knowledge which underlie these positions. Sandra 
Harding ( 1986a) has categorized feminist critics of science into three groups: 
the feminist empiricist group, the feminist standpoint group, and the postmodern 
feminist group. I suggest that this tripartite model, now the authoritative 
classification scheme informing feminist critics' perceptions of 
themselves and other critics of science, is based on misconceptions about 
scientific inquiry and its relationship to politics. The work of Donna Haraway 
(1989, 1991) and Helen Longino (1989, 1990) offers important ways to 
reconceptualize science, values and objectivity. A simplistic division between 
scientific objectivism and interpretationism (two sides of the same modernist 
coin) and other misconceptions about scientific inquiry have lead some 
standpoint and postmodern feminists to see feminist science as a contradiction 
in terms and some feminist scientists and standpoint theorists to see postmodern 
feminism as a contradiction in terms. In what follows, I review 
Harding's three groups in tum, with the aim of discarding the tripartite model 
and suggesting some ways in which feminist critiques of science can be 
redirected. 
 
 
 
 
"FEMINIST EMPIRICISTS" 
 
One set of feminist critics of science, mainly scientists themselves, are 
interested in creating a new science. Harding ( 1986a) calls this group "feminist 
empiricists," and among them are Sarah Hrdy (1981), Ruth Hubbard (1988), 
Marcia Millman, and Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1975). They hold that there is 
not enough good science being done: If science were done properly and if more 
women were in science, we would see fewer sexist knowledge claims. 
While many feminist theorists see feminist science as effective to the extent 
that women are beating scientists at their own game, fitting themselves into 
already authoritative methods of knowledge production,2 they assume this to 
be the most conservative of the feminist knowledge seeking projects. The 
reason for this assumption has to do with many feminists' skepticism about 
science and rationality. Those who assume that the problem is science-that 
science, when done properly, is domination-thus believe that no greater 
amount of adherence to science could make it better, let alone more feminist. 
For instance, MacKinnon states: 
 
In the Western philosophical tradition, method has sought 
authority: how to produce an account of knowledge which is 
certain, which ends speculation and precludes skepticism, 
which has power that no one else can as powerfully contest .... 
Its thrust has been to end diversity of viewpoint, so that there 
can be no valid disagreement over what knowing is right 
knowing. Its history is the history of an attempt to exert such 
power over reality as comes from methodological hegemony 
over the means of knowing, validating only those ways of 
proceeding which advance the project of producing what it 
regards as requisite certainty. Objectivity has been its answer, 
its standard, its holy grail. (MacKinnon 1989, 107) 
 
There is a problematic assumption behind this skepticism about science, 
however. MacKinnon is not discussing science, but the absolutism of positivism, 
which assumes that a truth of matters exists and that theoretical claims 
and assumptions of a program follow from, rather than play a role in determining 
and interpreting, the accumulated data (Longino 1990, 179). Because 
science is seen as the positivism that most sophisticated scientists have rejected 
quite a while ago, MacKinnon criticizes rationality, the ability to reason 
(Longino, 1989), by critiquing positivism. While these criticisms are relevant 
to the myth of science in our culture that many laypeople and some scientists 
invoke to justify their claims, the positivist account does not accurately 
describe the logic of inquiry and the practice of science. As Longino (1989, 
262) points out, the positivists got rationality wrong. Until feminists realize 
this, they will get science, and feminist scientists, wrong. 
 
Feminist scientists are not logical positivists who assume that value claims 
are subordinate to allegedly value-free observationally verifiable claims 
(Longino, 1990, 177). However, due to the conflation of science and positivism, 
other feminists such as Di Stefano (1990), Hawkesworth (1989), and 
Harding (1986a, 1990) make the mistake of assuming that feminist scientists 
maintain assumptions resembling positivism simply because they have not 
rejected science. For those who see science as positivism, feminist science looks 
pretty silly. Feminist scientists are trying to correct "bad science,'' but this does 
not imply that "good science" is objectivist, value free science. For instance, 
Hubbard states: 
 
What feminists have to contribute is the insistence that subjectivity 
and context cannot be stripped away, that they must be 
acknowledged if we want to understand nature and use the 
knowledge we gain without abusing it. . . . [W]e can try to 
understand the world, so to speak, from inside instead of pretending 
to be objective outsiders looking in. (Hubbard 1988, 
10, 13) 
 
Indeed, there is little evidence that feminist scientists insist that a better 
account of the world should be gained through objectivist science rather than 
through discussions of radical historical contingency and constructivism. Thus 
it is not the case that feminist scientists think that the appropriate method for 
producing knowledge about the world involves controlling the subjectivity of 
the observer in an attempt to reach some Archimedean point-of-viewlessness.3 
If any of them did, their case would surely be quite shallow. More likely, the 
suspicion that feminist scientists are contradictory conservatives is based on 
fundamental misunderstandings of science and rationality. 
 
The supposition that there could and should be a privileged correct description 
of the world from an extemalist perspective, or that such a privileged 
perspective is necessary for deciding between competing claims, could very 
well be due to the structures of domination which feminists criticize. Indeed, 
some scientists and many laypeople believe that social interests and values do 
not play any legitimate role in inquiry and that sexism, racism, and classism 
are either flawed add-ons or unpleasant facts that just happen to have been 
discovered by a neutral scientific observer (Longino, 1989 ). Feminist criticism, 
then, would better be directed toward those who pull what Haraway (1991) 
calls the "god-trick." An examination of some people's commingling of science 
and positivism would be a fruitful way to refocus feminist criticism. 
 
Feminist scientists, as I see them, are not repeating the errors of positivism. 
By connecting issues of domination with the positivist myth of science, they 
challenge those scientists who still cling to the positivist vision. Feminist 
scientists do not conclude that there is something wrong with rationality 
because the social context in which rationality has been carried out has been 
characterized by structures of domination. Although they have been historically 
associated, rationality is not inherently a masculine or white enterprise. 
Rationality, then, isn't the master's tool and feminist scientists are not engaged 
in a naive attempt to use the master's tools to dismantle the master's house. It 
is positivism, not rationality, which assumed that scientific objectivity meant 
point-of-viewlessness. These misguided views of science and rationality have 
moved some feminist critics to see "feminist science" as a contradiction in 
terms and to develop a second model for a feminist theory of knowledge. It is 
this model I consider next. 
 
 
"STANDPOINT THEORISTS" 
 
The second group of theorists, categorized by Harding (1986a) as "standpoint 
theorists" and exemplified by the work of Patricia Hill Collins (1989), 
Christine Di Stefano ( 1990), Nancy Hartsock ( 1983), Hilary Rose ( 1983), and 
Dorothy Smith (1987), has focused on the distortedness of the oppressor's 
viewpoint. It is the oppressed, they argue, that have a privileged epistemological 
position. Harding characterizes this position: "The oppressed are indeed 
damaged by their social experience, but what is a disadvantage in terms of their 
oppression can become an advantage in terms of science" (1990, 98). The 
standpoint(s) of the oppressed is(are) not privileged on moral or political 
grounds, but on empirical grounds, in a way that undercuts the distinction 
between the political and the empirical without ever acknowledging it. 
Feminist standpoint theorists use the Marxist and Enlightenment assumptions 
that there is a reality out there to which the oppressed have privileged 
access by virtue of the conditions of their oppression. They say that these 
politically achieved privileged standpoints provide less distorted vision (Hartsock 
1983). They say that the oppressed can see reality better because the 
view(s) of the oppressed is(are) not as partial and perverse as those of oppressors. 
For instance, Hartsock states: 
 
Women's lives, like men's, are structured by social relations 
which manifest the experience of the dominant gender and 
class. The ability to go beneath the surface of appearances to 
reveal the real but concealed social relations requires both 
theoretical and political activity. Feminist theorists must 
demand that feminist theorizing be grounded in women's material 
activity and must as well be part of the political struggle 
necessary to develop areas of social life modeled on this activity. 
(Hartsock 1983, 304) 
 
There are many explanations of the connection between gender and epistemological 
stances. An incomplete list includes: the gender division of labor 
which for women unifies manual, mental and emotional labors; the experience 
of mothering; menstruation cycles; differing experiences of embodiment 
between women and men; the experience of vaginal penetration; birthing; 
nursing; child-rearing and nurturing activities, which mediate the modes of 
knowing, one located in the body and the other passing beyond it; getting 
socialized in the family differently (girls seeking connectedness and boys 
seeking autonomy); getting socialized to prioritize contextual rules over 
abstract principles; and gender differences in separation and individuation as 
a result of being reared by females (see Collins 1989; Daly 1978; Keller 1985, 
in Collins 1989, 765; Hawkesworth 1987; Rose 1983; Smith 1985). These 
theories attempt to accommodate the privileged female subject, explain why 
women are better knowers, and, thus, why women's standpoints should be 
privileged. The main objections to standpoint theories revolve around their 
essentialist and objectivist assumptions. 
Why should women be privileged knowers? Afrocentric ways of knowing, 
contrasted with Western ways of knowing, parallel standpoint theorists' contrast 
of women's and men's ways of knowing (Harding 1986a; Gergen 1988). 
Afrocentric and feminist claims to epistemological advantage are both based 
on the ethic of care and experience-based knowledge (Collins 1989). Western 
women's participation in colonization practices alongside Western men makes 
Western women's ways of knowing arguably more similar to Western men's 
than to Third World women's. The goal of developing a "women's account" 
of the world in feminist theory subverts meaningful difference in the category 
"women." King ( 1988, 57) criticizes this goal: "The assertion of commonality, 
indeed of the universality and primacy of female oppression, denies the other 
structured inequalities of race, class, religion, and nationality, as well as 
denying the diverse cultural heritages that affect the lives of many women." 
Even if an unintended consequence, any tendency toward universality in 
feminism is in danger of reproducing the kind of social structure that it is 
attempting to change. 
 
While acknowledging that there is no one way of accounting for women's 
and men's specific ways of knowing, since there are many ways of coming to 
be different from oppressors, the goal of standpoint theorists has been to make 
women privileged subjects. But a critique that rejects a man-centered epistemology 
because it provides a distorted view must also reject a woman-centered 
one for the same reason (Hekman 1990). Once any possible essentialism is 
abandoned in the standpoint epistemology, its goal of using women's viewpoints 
to gain the truth is undermined. In other words, the logical conclusion 
of the perspectivism of the standpoint theory leaves us rejecting the very 
possibility of a truth about reality (Hawkesworth 1989, 330). 
 
Often used terms such as "less partial" and "less distorted" to describe the 
knowledge of the oppressed reveal an objectivist commitment to a reality 
which can be more, or less, accurately reflected. The assumption that feminist 
standpoints are special and less distorted also reveals an assumption that the 
oppressed are innocent and pure of power and that victimhood is the only 
ground for insight (Haraway 1991, 157). Brown criticizes this premise: "This 
desire for knowledge accounts that are innocent of power, that position us 
outside power, is rooted in the need to make power answer to reason/morality 
and to prohibit demands for accountability in the opposite direction" (Brown 
1991, 76). 
 
Longino (1989, 262) points out that while feminist standpoint theorists 
have identified the interest-laden content of scientific theories, they have 
condemned the methodology because of its results. This leaves feminists 
without common and conclusion-independent ways of evaluating competing 
knowledge claims and persuading others. Standpoint theorists have proposed 
a new methodology, privileging subjectivity, intuition, or a feminine way of 
knowing as a way to get new results. In other words, feminist standpoint 
theorists have opposed as androcentric the idea that ahistorical principles of 
inquiry (which they suppose science to be about) can insure ever more perfect 
representations of the world (Harding 1990, 97) but they end up asserting that 
radically historical, contingent subjects and principles of inquiry can insure 
ever more perfect, or at least ever less false, representations of the world. This 
view combines radical contingency with a touch of objectivism to say that a 
culturally and historically contingent subject could provide, by virtue of that 
subjectivity, an empirically better view of the world. Flax refutes this notion: 
"We cannot simultaneously claim ( 1) that the mind, the self, and knowledge 
are socially constituted and that what we can know depends upon our social 
practices and contexts and (2) that feminist theory can uncover the Truth of 
the whole once and for all" (Flax 1987, 633 ). Assumptions that feminist claims 
are pure, innocent, truer or that feminists have "the answer" to clear everything 
up follow the modernist logic of realism and humanism (Haraway 1991; 
Hawkesworth 1989). 
 
Standpoint theorists might argue that they do not depend upon a belief in 
a reality "out there." The simple fact that men as a group oppress women as a 
group means that women's and men's claims are not equal. But on what grounds 
are they not equal? Are women's claims privileged over men's on political 
grounds or empirical grounds? As soon as the political aspect is made explicit, 
the standpoint theorist is embracing the "relativist" position she was trying to 
avoid. How can anyone have a reliable view of "nature" and social events if 
meaning and observation are theory-laden and theories are value-laden? 
Aren't we left with radical subjectivism and, hence, an inability to make any 
knowledge claims at all? How would we decide between competing claims? 
When we acknowledge the differences among women, as Harding (1991) has 
recently done more adamantly, we realize that we will produce conflicting, 
multiple knowledge accounts. The problem constructed by the standpoint 
theorists, then, that of how to decide between competing claims, is never 
resolved. The final group I consider seems less worried about competing claims. 
 
 
"POSTMODERN FEMINISTS" 
 
Feminists critical of Enlightenment and humanist assumptions, such as 
Wendy Brown (1991), Jane Flax (1987), Donna Haraway (1991), and Susan 
Hekman ( 1990), often referred to as "postmodern feminists," question the very 
existence of a "ready-made world that is out there for the reflecting" (Harding 
1986b, 655) and also the ability of the mind to reflect this alleged world 
perfectly.4 They argue that, while it may be tempting to say the way things 
really are to those in power, feminists would do better to challenge the 
plausibility of claims that any perspective on the world could escape partiality 
(Flax 1987) or that any certain person or group's partiality is better in any 
apolitical way. 
 
The standpoint theorist's aversion to postmodern theories rests on the 
assumption that the postmodern feminist position leaves no room for persuasion 
or deciding between competing claims. For instance, Di Stefano ( 1990, 
77) asserts that postmodernism disallows judgement. Standpoint theorists 
worry that under the postmodern framework women will not be able to make 
any knowledge claims at all. Di Stefano states this feminist aversion to 
postmodernism: 
 
The postmodernist project, if seriously adopted by feminists, 
would make any semblance of a feminist politics impossible. To 
the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a specific 
constituency or subject, namely, women, the postmodernist 
prohibition against subject-centered inquiry and theory undermines 
the legitimacy of a broad-based organized movement 
dedicated to articulating and implementing the goals of such a 
constituency. (Di Stefano 1990, 76) 
 
If the transcendental subject is denied altogether, how will women constitute 
themselves as subjects? Hartsock argues that postmodernism critiques modernist 
theories without putting anything in their place: 
 
For those of us who want to understand the world systematically 
in order to change it, postmodernist theories at their best give 
little guidance .... At worst, postmodernist theories can recapitulate 
the effects of Enlightenment theories which deny the 
right to participate in defining the terms of interaction. (Hartsock 
1990, 159-60) 
 
Since theorists of postmodernity have criticized Enlightenment visions of 
knowledge, those who hear the criticisms with modernist ears associate postmodernism 
with relativism. Indeed, misconceptions about the relationship 
between knowledge and politics have lead some feminist scientists and standpoint 
theorists to see feminists using postmodern approaches as politically 
disengaged. But the postmodern philosophy does not make knowledge claims 
or judgment impossible. It simply disallows absolutist or irresponsible claims. 
I have already shown that the standpoint epistemology offers no solution to 
their "problem" of how to resolve conflicting accounts. Brown (1991, 77) 
states that modernity "bequeaths to us a preference for deriving norms 
epistemologically over deciding on them politically." Foundationalism is not necessary 
to privilege a particular perspective. Ergo, the standpoint theorists do not 
need to fear postmodernism as relativism.5 
 
The feminist arguments about rationality seem to be displaced arguments 
about perspectives. Two arguments can be completely rational and yet opposed 
if they are based on different background assumptions. For example, some 
men's rights literature argues that women oppress men because men aren't 
getting as much sex as they want and feel they deserve. Warren Farrell (1986) 
argues that women have power over men because men are constantly frustrated 
by women's sexual power over them and that this oppression is just as great as 
the oppression women experience by living in a rape culture. Women are 
routinely forced to submit to unwanted sex in committed relationships and 
that is oppressive; but equally oppressive, in this view, is the fact that men are 
forced to commit to women in monogamous relationships when they would 
rather be sleeping with lots of women, uncommitted. Feminists would disagree 
with this position but not necessarily with the data (the given state of affairs), 
only the hypotheses for which that data is taken as evidence. The background 
assumption behind Farrell's position-that men not getting enough sex or men 
being forced to marry in order to get enough sex is morally equivalent to women 
being forced to have sex in order to stay alive--is disagreeable to feminists. 
Competing claims can be assessed in light of background assumptions rather 
than their rationality. As Longino (1990) points out, evidential reasoning is 
context-dependent: data can only serve as evidence for a hypothesis in light 
of certain background assumptions. Background assumptions carry the values 
in scientific inquiry. Positivism would assume access to truth while this sort of 
contextual empiricism does not. Rationality is not connected to guarantees of 
truth nor is objectivity connected to exact representation (Longino 1989). 
The standpoint theory need not be an essentialist, objectivist, 
"correspondence" theory; what saves it from relativism is its political commitment 
to privileging women's stories over men's, or certain women's stories over 
certain men's. 
 
Objectivity can refer to collective scientific method rather than a characteristic 
of individual scientific practitioners. Scientific inquiry must be a social 
practice if it is to be objective (Longino 1989). Objectivity, then, does not 
mean that claims are free of value-laden background assumptions. Background 
assumptions can and should be up for critical scrutiny. A method of inquiry is 
objective, in this sense, to the extent that it permits transformative criticism, 
where its procedures and results respond to criticism (Longino 1990, 76). Since 
intellectual authority is not equally shared, the scientific community will not 
respond to everyone's criticism and to this extent a scientific community will 
not meet its goal of objectivity. Even if it did, we would not necessarily wind 
up with one account of the world. Two theories can be equally rational, use 
the same data, and yet have different background assumptions that keep them 
at a stand-off. 
 
It is true that "some assumptions are not perceived as such by any members 
of the community. When, for instance, background assumptions are shared by 
all members of a community, they acquire an invisibility which renders them 
unavailable for criticism" (Longino 1989, 268). To positivist scientists, 
women's criticisms have been thought to be "interested critiques" attempting 
to bias science, a realm which portrays the world as it really is, regardless of 
how anyone wishes it were. It is therefore the context of rationality that should 
be the focus of feminist critique. Viewing scientific knowledge as social 
knowledge and objectivity as a social achievement means that a "critical 
discussion among a plurality of individuals about a commonly accessible 
phenomenon" (Longino 1990, 7 4) provides the possibility for objectivity. But, 
of course, the lack of plurality is precisely the problem. Feminists can point out 
how objectivity in this new sense will not be realized until the scientific 
community is more democratic, diverse, and responsive to criticism from 
non-elite groups. This is why it is the context of scientific inquiry that deserves 
the attention of feminist critics. 
 
Haraway (1991 188, 193) argues for a concept of objectivity that means 
"situated knowledges" or "critical positioning." This view of objectivity values 
knowledge claims which are partial, situated, accountable, and responsible 
rather than "value-free," innocent, and totalizing. Rejecting the innocence of 
identity politics as politically irresponsible, postmodern feminists advocate 
claiming "what I want for us" instead of "who I am" (Brown 1991 ). As Haraway 
notes: "Politics and ethics ground struggles for the contests over what may 
count as rational knowledge" (1991, 193). Such struggles are struggles over 
vision. In this view, the most strategic kind of feminist knowledge would be a 
power-sensitive positioned rationality (Haraway 1991). Brown urges us to 
"seize [the opening in postmodernity] to develop democratic processes for 
formulating collective post epistemological and post ontological 
judgments" (1991, 80). All discourses, feminist obviously included, can 
be deconstructed to reveal moral positions. Positioning is not a problem. 
Positioning is promising. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It may seem useful for feminists to use standpoint or objectivist epistemologies 
to convince modernists of their claims. But it does not look like this has 
been a conscious effort to trick the patriarchy. Rather, it appears to be 
unreflexive participation in dominant narratives about knowledge. Harding 
(1990) insists that feminist postmodernism must be somewhat modernist in 
order to be feminist (i.e., political) and because of this feminists will have to 
develop a tolerance for ambiguity and a philosophy of ambivalence (Harding 
1986a, 1990). She asserts that feminists will have to tolerate the contradictions 
in feminist epistemologies, since, in her view, any feminist politics depends on 
modernism, contradictory as that is. However, the kind of ambiguity that 
Harding suggests that we tolerate is unnecessary. 
 
The tolerance for ambiguity need not be over modernist assumptions. 
Feminists do not need modernist assumptions to be politically engaged, to 
make knowledge claims, or to persuade. Perhaps more appropriate, then, is a 
tolerance of multiplicity which accommodates the contingency of antifoundationalism, 
contextual empiricism, partial perspectives, and situated 
knowledges. In Longino's terms, this means relinquishing the ideals of certainty 
and of the permanence of knowledge and developing a tolerance for 
theoretical pluralism (1990, 230-32). The radically redefined relationship 
between knowledge and power implies that escaping partiality and constructing 
a universalizing perspective would only make for a feminist 
fundamentalism. 
 
The most recent arguments for a standpoint theory (see, e.g., Harding 1991) 
have stated that the experiences of marginalized people cannot provide the 
answers to questions but can only generate the problems for research. If this is 
true, though, the category "standpoint" is not distinct from the category 
"postmodern." Postmodern feminists have political commitments, as do feminist 
scientists. The postmodern perspective is not anti-science but anti-objectivist; 
it is not anti-judgment but anti-totalizing. Thus, postmodernists have 
standpoints and this is perfectly compatible with the responsible production 
of scientific knowledge. 
 
There are no "epistemological paradoxes" (Di Stefano 1990, 73) in feminist 
science and postmodern feminists have not committed political suicide. Feminists 
can embrace science, not because we can trust that the facts that we 
"uncover" will "prove" feminist ideas (as though we'll surely find feminist 
monkeys if we only look "objectively" or empathetically), but rather because 
knowledge claims are discourses informed by perspectives. If science involves 
responsible story-telling, contingent knowledge claims, and critical positioning, 
then those critically positioned feminists engaged in the political contest 
for meanings in the sciences could be considered postmodern, postmodemists 
could be said to have standpoints, and insidiously sexist or objectivist claims 
could appropriately be considered "bad science." 
 
NOTES 
I wish to thank Thomas Wilson for many stimulating discussions about science and 
methodology. I am also grateful to Neal King, Robin Lloyd, and the anonymous 
reviewers of Hypatia for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1. Feminist critiques of science are most often focused on the social and behavioral 
sciences, although the critiques do not distinguish between types of science. Whether 
one is a feminist or a sexist may be of little consequence in the actual scientific research 
process on DNA, for instance (although identifying the double helix is one of many 
possible levels of abstraction), compared to the significance these ideologies would 
have in the process of studying chimpanzees or people's patterns of moral reasoning. 
Feminist critiques of science have exposed the ways in which many social and 
behavioral scientists invoke a notion of objectivity, and even positivism, that would only 
be appropriate, if anywhere at all, in the natural sciences. This is not to say, however, 
that feminist criticism is not relevant to aspects of the natural sciences. Since feminist 
critiques of science have to do with the social and institutional settings in which scientific 
knowledge is produced in addition to details of research processes, relevant to feminist 
critics might be, for example, why Rosalind Franklin's work went relatively 
unacknowledged by James Watson and Francis Crick, why the preoccupation with life 
that set the stage for trying to find the double helix, and the ways in which Francis Crick 
articulated the "mad pursuit" of scientific discovery. 
2. It is still true; however, that some scientists, failing to see their own interests in 
knowledge production, say that a feminist scientist is interested and not "objective" 
because she is a feminist. 
3. This is one definition of "objectivity" (see Longino 1989). I distinguish this from a 
second way to conceive of objectivity later in the paper. 
4. Flax sums up the critique of the Enlightenment. There is skepticism about the 
following assumptions: 
The existence of a stable, coherent self.... Reason and its "science" philosophy- can 
provide an objective, reliable, and universal foundation for knowledge ... The knowledge 
acquired from the right use of reason will be "True”.... Reason itself has transcendental 
and universal qualities. . . . Freedom consists in obedience to laws that conform to the 
necessary results of the right use of reason.... By grounding claims to authority in 
reason, the conflicts between truth, knowledge, and power can be overcome. Truth can 
serve power without distortion; in turn, by utilizing knowledge in the service of power 
both freedom and progress will be assured. Knowledge can be both neutral (e.g., 
grounded in universal reason, not particular "interests") and also socially beneficial. ... 
Science, as the exemplar of the right use of reason, is also the paradigm for all true 
knowledge. Science is neutral in its methods and contents but socially beneficial in its 
results.... Language is in some sense transparent.... Objects are not linguistically (or 
socially) constructed; they are merely made present to consciousness by naming and 
the right use of language. (In Harding 1990, 102) 
5. For arguments against epistemology and foundationalism, see: Bernstein ( 1983 ); 
Derrida (1981); Gunnell (1986); Hekman (1990); Herrnstein Smith (1988); Herzog 
(1985); Kress (1979); Krupnick (1983); and Rorty (1989, 1991a, 1991b). 
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